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Abstract 
The past twenty years have seen an increase in the importance of the body in 
psychology, neuroscience and philosophy of mind. This ‘embodied’ trend 
challenges the orthodox view in cognitive science in several ways: it 
downplays the traditional ‘mind-as-computer’ approach and emphasizes the 
role of interactions between the brain, body and environment. In this article I 
review recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the 
approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and 
representation. Finally I look at the current relationship between orthodox 
cognitive science and the study of mental disorder, and consider the 
implications that the embodied trend could have for issues in 
psychopathology. 
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Introduction 
 
The past twenty years have seen a change in attitude towards the body in psychology, 
neuroscience and philosophy of mind. These ‘cognitive sciences’ had previously 
thought of the mind as a collection of computational processes which could be studied 
in abstraction from the brain which implemented those processes. The new trend in 
‘embodied’ cognitive science has largely argued against this computational stance, 
and promoted the idea that studying the mind requires studying the biological brain in 
its natural setting: embedded within the body, interacting with the environment.  
 In this article, I introduce the themes and commitments of orthodox cognitive 
science, focusing on the computational account of cognition and the inner 
representational states it requires. I explore the beginnings of the embodied cognitive 
science movement in the works of Brooks (1991), Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
(1991) and Clark and Chalmers (1998), before reviewing five recent works in the 
embodied trend: Boundaries of the Mind (Wilson 2004), Reconstructing the Cognitive 
World (Wheeler 2005), How the Body Shapes the Mind (Gallagher 2005), Action in 
Perception (Noë 2004) and Mind in Life (Thompson 2007). I conclude with an 
examination of the relationship between cognitive science and the study of 
psychopathology. Orthodox cognitive science has provided a supportive framework 
for psychiatry, but has done so by relying on the precise commitments which are 
challenged by embodied cognitive science. There are, however, reasons to think that 
embodied cognitive science would be useful to the study of mental disorder: it 
provides a way of thinking about abstract cognition as strongly related to bodily 
activities and processes, providing possible explanations for the spread of symptoms 
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found in many psychiatric disorder. Furthermore, much embodied cognitive science 
emphasizes the importance and credibility of the concept of conscious experience in 
scientific discourse. As such, it may provide an opportunity for the scientists of 
psychopathology and the phenomenological psychiatrists to integrate their research 
into one framework. 
 
 
The Computational Mind: An Introduction to Orthodox Cognitive Science 
 
Cognitive science is the multidisciplinary study of the mind by researchers from 
philosophy, artificial intelligence, psychology, linguistics, neuroscience and related 
areas. Since the 1950s, cognitive scientists have been using scientific methods, 
techniques and models to explore the processes which generate intelligent behavior. 
Prior to this ‘cognitive revolution’, behaviorist psychology had prohibited the study of 
such internal mental states and insisted that the only area of viable scientific study 
was the observable behavior of organisms analyzed in terms of stimulus, conditioning 
and response. Cognitive science challenged behaviorism by adopting the metaphor of 
software programs running on digital computers, giving scientific credibility to the 
study of the mental ‘software’ that was run on the brain’s hardware.  
Orthodox cognitive science is based on the idea that cognition is 
representational and computational: our mental states represent features of the world, 
and our mental processes operate over these inner symbols, transforming and 
manipulating them. Thinking of the mind in terms of computation seemed to allow a 
causal explanation of action (and mental processing more generally) in terms of inner 
representational states: my desire to have x and my belief that doing y will get me x 
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will, under normal circumstances, lead me to do y. Inner representations thus function 
syntactically, which allows them to be processed computationally, but they also carry 
semantic content or meaning: x might represent food, y might represent the opening of 
the fridge. 1 
As well as a commitment to computation and representations, orthodox 
cognitive science extends the computer metaphor by drawing a distinction between 
‘software’ and ‘hardware’. According to this way of thinking, our cognitive processes 
are akin to computer programs or software, which can be completely specified 
without reference to the hardware of the brain which is implementing them. This 
separation of mind from brain should not be interpreted as dualistic: orthodox 
cognitive scientists firmly believe that what we call ‘mind’ is simply the functioning 
of the brain, but they believe that from an explanatory point of view there is much to 
be gained by abstraction from the neural level – in much the same way as we benefit 
in daily life from taking tables and chairs to be solid objects rather than collections of 
shifting atoms. It is worth noting, however, that many orthodox cognitive scientists no 
longer adhere to the idea of a strong distinction between software and hardware, or 
insist on a strictly ‘top-down’ approach: much important work is currently being done 
in cognitive neuroscience, where the focus is on a plurality of levels, functional and 
neural, and the relationships between them. 
The last important point to note about orthodox cognitive science is its relative 
silence on the question of consciousness. The orthodox approach focuses on the 
functional details of the cognitive processing itself and has traditionally had little or 
nothing to say on ‘phenomenology’, the experiential quality of conscious mental life. 
Computational models allow for thought processes to be considered scientifically, but 
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it has traditionally been difficult to find a place for the subjective first-person 
perspective in the orthodox science of cognition. 
Several more recent developments in cognitive science deserve a mention. The 
1980s saw the rise of ‘connectionist’ cognitive science, which challenged the classical 
idea of sequential symbol processing by positing the distributed processing of parallel 
network connections. One of the motivating factors behind this trend in cognitive 
science is that connectionist networks seem to bear more similarity to actual brain 
operation than classical symbol-crunching models. The connectionist approach should 
still be viewed as orthodox cognitive science, however, because it is committed to 
cognition as a computational process over representations: parallel processing is a 
different form of computation from the narrow classical view, and its representations 
are distributed over a network rather than isolated to a symbol, but the key features 
are retained (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 1991).2 
To sum up, orthodox cognitive science (both classical and connectionist) 
characterizes cognition as computation over inner representations; it also sidesteps the 
issue of consciousness (Searle 1992). Importantly, it is also radically disembodied: 
even those cognitive scientists exploring the biological foundations for cognition 
focus solely on the brain (Thompson 2007). Everything outside the brain, such as the 
body and the environment in which it is embedded, is assumed to be nothing more 
than a source of input to – and an arena for output from – the cognitive processes 
taking place inside the head (Wheeler 2005). All of these commitments are challenged 
to a certain degree by work in the embodied cognitive science.  
 
Embodiment and Cognitive Science: The Beginnings 
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The importance of the body to our mental life is not a new idea: it can be traced back 
at least to the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 1962). The 
incorporation of embodiment into cognitive science, however, began in earnest in the 
field of robotics with the work of Rodney Brooks (Brooks 1991). The orthodox 
approach to robotics was to construct perceptual input systems and action output 
systems, separated by a central cognitive system which computed over 
representations. Brooks realized that the disembodied, inference-based approach 
didn’t yield results as successfully as tailoring the design of the robot body to the 
requirements of its physical environment. Brooks’ key insight was that a certain range 
of (albeit limited) intelligent behavior could be modeled without recourse to explicit 
representations and internal models, suggesting instead that “the world is its own, best 
model” (Brooks 1991, 139). The idea is that if some intelligent behavior can be 
produced by the interactions between the robot and the world, there is no need for 
separate (internal) representations: bodily and environmental structures can do the 
work previously attributed to internal states. This focus on real-world, real-time, task-
oriented robotics was completely at odds with the orthodox approach in cognitive 
science. 
Brooks’ work was soon inspiring others to rethink the commitments of 
orthodox cognitive science: one key work was The Embodied Mind (Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch, 1991), which aimed “to enlarge the horizon of cognitive 
science to include the broader panorama of human, lived experience” (Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch 1991, 14). They emphasized the role of consciousness in any 
account of our mental life, and claimed that the kinds of conscious experiences we 
have depends heavily on our bodies and their interactions with the world in which we 
are embedded. In addition to their focus on consciousness and their rejection of the 
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neurocentric view, the authors of The Embodied Mind also dismissed the idea that 
cognition requires representation, thus hailing a radical departure from orthodox 
cognitive science. Representations, they contended, are only required by a theory 
which views the mind as having to pick up or recover objective properties of the 
world. The Embodied Mind coined the term ‘enactivism’ for the alternate view that 
“cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but it is 
rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of…actions that a being in the 
world performs” (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991, 9). The key idea behind 
enactivism is that perception and action are firmly intertwined, and that higher 
cognitive capacities emerge from these linkages between the sensory and motor 
systems.  
The idea of the embodied and embedded mind was shortly followed by the 
radical view of the mind as extended into the environment. In their paper ‘The 
Extended Mind’ (1998), Andy Clark and David Chalmers considered the question of 
where the mind stops and the rest of the world begins, and challenge the intuitive 
view that the boundaries of the mind are those of our skin and skull. Clark and 
Chalmers drew attention to the way we use parts of the external environment to 
‘scaffold’ our cognitive processes: consider the use of a slide rule for complicated 
calculations, or the rearranging of Scrabble tiles to help identify words. Their claim 
was that external states and processes can play a sufficiently similar role in 
psychological explanations of behavior as their internal ‘cognitive’ counterparts. For 
at least some explanatory purposes the boundary between internal and external seems 
unimportant, and so restricting cognitive processes to internal mechanisms seems to 
stand in the way of good explanatory practice. Rather, when we are closely coupled 
with parts of the environment in a causally complex way, we should think of 
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cognition as extending beyond the brain into the world. Clark and Chalmers clearly 
opposed the neurocentric view of orthodox cognitive science, and challenged the 
orthodox requirement for solely inner representations. They had little to say on 
consciousness however, and were not committed to its physical basis extending 
beyond the brain. 
Most of the work in contemporary embodied cognitive science can be seen as 
following on from one or both of The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
1991) and ‘The Extended Mind’ (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Within the overall 
embodied, embedded, enactive and extended trend, there are many differences among 
research programs: attitudes towards computation and representation differ, as does 
the emphasis on conscious experience. However, all are committed to the rejection of 
the neurocentric view that an explanation of our rich mental lives can come from 
focusing solely on the brain. 
 
 
Recent Work in Embodied Cognitive Science 
 
Boundaries of the Mind, Robert A. Wilson 
Not all work in embodied cognitive science sets out to overthrow the orthodoxy. 
Orthodox cognitive science has yielded successful results by modeling the mind on 
computational principles, and some researchers have sought to retain the core 
commitments of computation and representation while rejecting the neurocentric 
element of the traditional approach. In Boundaries of the Mind (Wilson 2004), Robert 
A. Wilson attempts to reconcile the Clark and Chalmers (1998) idea of the extended 
mind with the standard computational picture.  
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Wilson’s book is the first in his trilogy of works exploring the concept of the 
individual in the cognitive, biological and social sciences. In this volume his aim is to 
reject ‘individualism’ in cognitive science: the thesis that the mental state of an 
individual can and should be understood without reference to anything outside the 
individual. His main point of attack is not orthodox cognitive science itself, but 
several traditional ideas in philosophy of mind which lead philosophers to support the 
orthodoxy. Philosophers of mind traditionally think of mental states and processes in 
terms of their ‘realizers’ or their ‘supervenience base’, conceived of as internal parts 
of the individual. Wilson’s core argument in Boundaries of the Mind is that these 
philosophical concepts can all be thought of in terms that support a wider picture of 
mentality: traditional philosophy of mind does not entail orthodox cognitive science. 
Wilson argues that traditional philosophy of mind is mistaken in its emphasis 
on what he calls ‘smallism’: the idea that an explanation of something requires a 
reductive analysis of that thing into smaller and smaller components. Wilson claims 
that because so many of our psychological states are context sensitive, they cannot be 
explained by reducing them to inner mechanisms and structures. Instead, we should 
look at both the state and the context as the explanation, which can be understood not 
by breaking it down but rather by placing in a wider perspective: an explanatory 
strategy he labels ‘integrative synthesis’, which “departs from the smallist views that 
typically drive researchers to look further ‘into’ the brain in search of cognitive 
systems” (Wilson 2004, 212).  
Without a commitment to smallism, Wilson claims we are freed from having 
to view computation as an internal process: 
“it is sometimes appropriate to offer a formal or computational 
characterization of an organism’s environment, and to view parts of the brain 
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of the organism, computationally characterized, together with this 
environment so characterized, as constituting a unified computational system”.  
(Wilson 2004, 167) 
To accompany this view of ‘wide computation’, Wilson proposes ‘exploitative 
representation’: 
“Representations need not be thought of as internal copies of or codes for 
worldly structures. Rather, representation is an activity that individuals 
perform in extracting and deploying information that is used in their further 
actions.” (Wilson 2004, 183) 
Wilson claims that our representational capacities are enabled not by internal 
mechanisms of the brain, but rather “by embodied states of the whole person, or by 
the wide system that includes (parts of) the brain” (Wilson 2004, 188). He is not 
committed to the view that cognition must be computational: his aim is rather to show 
that the computational view is at least consistent with an embedded, extended mind. 
Wilson’s focus throughout Boundaries of the Mind is mostly on cognitive 
processes rather than on conscious experience. He does, however, put forward an 
account of consciousness as “temporally extended, scaffolded, and embodied and 
embedded” (Wilson 2004, 215), but his focus is largely on the thought-like aspects of 
consciousness such as introspection, rather than on experiential aspects. Wilson’s 
project is less revisionary than many in embodied cognitive science, in that it seeks to 
reconcile some of its commitments with traditional views in philosophy of mind. 
 
Recontructing the Cognitive World, Michael Wheeler 
In contrast, Michael Wheeler’s Reconstructing the Cognitive World (Wheeler 2005) 
wholeheartedly embraces the embodied trend, calling for cognitive science “to put 
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cognition back in the brain, put the brain back in the body, and the body back in the 
world” (Wheeler 2005, 11). As well as a general overview of what he calls the 
‘embodied-embedded’ trend in cognitive science, Wheeler also outlines a framework 
for thinking about the issues involved in terms of Heidegger’s account of everyday 
cognition put forward in Being and Time (Heidegger 1926), which he claims can 
clarify conceptual issues in embodied cognitive science.  
Wheeler identifies several key commitments of the embodied trend in 
cognitive science. Whereas orthodox cognitive science takes abstract reasoning tasks 
as its paradigm processes, embodied cognitive science focuses on our flexible 
context-specific responses to environmental stimuli: examples include negotiating a 
complex space, and catching a ball. The motivation behind this is that our brains have 
evolved as action-controllers, and the ‘offline’ cognition that the orthodoxy focuses 
on is secondary to our primary ‘online’ real-time cognitive skills. Furthermore, in 
embodied cognitive science this primary online intelligence is not taken to be 
generated solely by brains, but by complex causal networks involving brain, body and 
world. Wheeler’s more controversial claim is that embodied cognitive science should 
be committed to thinking of cognitive processes in terms of dynamical systems rather 
than traditional computation. 
The dynamical systems approach is often favored by researchers in embodied 
cognitive science. Dynamical systems, like computational systems, involve processes 
and structures. But they are state-dependent systems that can accurately model 
continuous quantitative changes over time when governed by nonlinear differential 
equations. Given embodied cognitive science’s emphasis on real-time real-world 
cognition, it is not surprising that they often favor this nonlinear dynamical approach. 
A second reason embodied cognitive science opts for nonlinear dynamicism is that 
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whereas computational transitions require representational states over which to 
operate, nonlinear dynamical systems do not face any such requirements; for 
embodied theorists who are opposed to representational explanations, these dynamical 
systems provide an alternate framework. Wheeler is quick to point out, however, that 
“all manner of structures in a dynamical system might perform a representational 
function” (Wheeler 2005, 97): dynamical systems do not have to represent, but there 
is nothing to say they can’t represent. Inner representational activity is a necessary 
condition for computation, but not a sufficient one. 
Many people working embodied cognitive science import the idea of 
dynamical systems architecture as an alternative to a computational architecture. 
Wheeler, however, argues that “computational systems are a subset of dynamical 
systems” (Wheeler 2005, 103): computational dynamical systems feature 
representations and realize well-defined input–output functions, and are not 
temporally rich in character. Wheeler’s liberal framework permits 
“the construction of hybrid explanatory models in which computational and 
noncomputational processes coexist and interact [which] allows us to 
understand the target space of possible cognitive processes using a single, 
fully integrated conceptual framework” (Wheeler 2005, 114).  
Wheeler is not prepared to replace computation with dynamical systems: while the 
dynamical systems framework works well for online cognition, he admits that as far 
as offline cognition is concerned, the computational representational model may be 
correct: 
“[There is] an important but ring-fenced place for orthodox cognitive-
scientific thinking within our embodied-embedded framework. Viewed this 
way, the historical mistake of orthodox cognitive science has been its 
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enthusiasm for extending its distinctive models and principles beyond the 
borders of offline intelligence” (Wheeler 2005: 247).  
It should be clear from this that Wheeler is not opposed to representations. He thinks 
there might be a place for inner representations in cases of offline cognition, such as 
mentally adding up how many times one has visited the dentist in the past year, or 
imagining a sequence of moves in a future chess game. Wheeler also wants to argue 
that cases of online cognition such as playing squash or escaping from a predator – 
despite being generated by the causal web of brain, body and world – can involve 
representations.  The representations he has in mind are not symbolic or context 
independent encodings, but partial models of the world like those used by Brooks’ 
robots: ‘action oriented’ representations. Wheeler realizes that once we extend the 
notion of representation out of the head, we run the risk of allowing anything to 
become a representation: to avoid this trivial spread and retain an explanatory concept 
of representation, he dedicates part of the book to working out criteria which would 
enable us to distinguish representational from non-representational features.  
Wheeler suggests a Heideggerian approach to cognitive science, but despite 
the fact that Heidegger’s method is termed ‘phenomenological’, Wheeler has little to 
say about the phenomena of human experience, or consciousness. He maintains that 
while Heidegger used phenomenology as a methodological tool, it should not be 
considered as a cure for the problems of orthodox cognitive science but “rather as a 
way or articulating what is, to a large extent, an independent and already happening 
transition in the fundamental character of the discipline” (Wheeler 2005: 124).  
 
How the Body Shapes the Mind, Shaun Gallagher 
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One book which does emphasize the role of phenomenology in embodied cognitive 
science is Shaun Gallagher’s How the Body Shapes the Mind (Gallagher 2005). 
Gallagher puts forward a strong argument for the importance of first-person conscious 
experience to much recent scientific work, including examples from developmental 
psychology on the newborn baby’s awareness of its own movements, and work in 
neuroscience on amputees’ experience of phantom limbs. His insistence on the 
importance of the body puts him firmly in opposition to orthodox cognitive science, 
but so does his commitment to the role of phenomenal experience. For Gallagher, the 
two are strongly linked: his major claim in the book is that consciousness and 
cognition are shaped and structured by the details of our embodiment. Bodily 
movement, he claims, “contributes to the shaping of perception, emotional 
experience, memory, judgment, and the understanding of the self and others” 
(Gallagher 2005, 10).  
In addition to furthering research in embodied cognitive science, Gallagher’s 
aim is also a methodological one. He realizes that as interest in embodiment grows 
across philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, it becomes increasingly important to 
develop a conceptual framework and common vocabulary to integrate discussions 
between people from different disciplines. His key contribution is to distinguish 
between the ‘body image’ and the ‘body schema’: our body image is constituted by 
our conscious beliefs about and attitudes towards our bodies, whereas our body 
schema is the system of processes which function without our reflective awareness to 
constantly regulate our movement. 
Gallagher uses empirical examples involving bodily posture, muscular tension 
and emotion to argue that changes to our body schema can affect our perceptions of 
our bodies and our environments. Once he has established the role embodiment plays 
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in shaping conscious perceptual experiences, he argues that perception is basic to all 
other forms of cognition to build up a general framework. Gallagher’s strategy for 
establishing the importance of embodiment for cognition is thus an indirect one: the 
idea of conscious experience as shaped by the body is an essential stepping-stone in 
his argument. 
Gallagher takes his arguments for the importance of the body to be an 
argument against the computational view of cognition: 
“In so far as cognition is reducible to computations, and computations can, in 
principle, run on silicon-based hardware, nothing like a human body seems to 
be required for cognition.” (Gallagher 2005, 134) 
Gallagher argues that he has shown that the human body does seem to be required for 
cognition, therefore cognition cannot be computation. He does not offer an alternative 
account, but seems to be open to the dynamical systems model: he emphasizes the 
temporal nature of experience, and the dynamic structures shared by embodied 
movement and cognition. He claims that some aspects of cognition are best explained 
by reference to our bodies themselves, not by reference to inner symbols which 
represent the bodily states in question.  
Gallagher’s account is radical in that it takes an embodied approach to not just 
online, action-related intelligent behavior but also to the types of offline intelligence 
many feel is more difficult to characterize without inner representations. Take the 
example of how we understand each other’s beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions: 
the orthodox picture assumes that we either theorize or simulate internally and then 
communicate in speech or action. Gallagher, however, suggests that prior to the 
acquisition of a capacity to theorize or simulate, we have the non-conceptual ability to 
understand others that comes from embodied interaction. He posits that our 
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“embodied practices constitute our primary access for understanding others” 
(Gallagher 2005, 224), that is, we have a direct understanding of a person’s intentions 
because their intentions are explicitly expressed in their embodied actions. For those 
researchers in embodied cognitive science who downplay internal representations, 
explaining higher-level cognitive processes such as mental state attribution is a major 
challenge: Gallagher (2005) takes the first steps toward meeting this challenge.  
 
Perception in Action, Alva Noë 
Like Gallagher, Alva Noë is interested in the role played by the body in shaping 
conscious perceptual experience. Perception in Action (Noë 2004) is an exploration of 
how bodily activity determines what we perceive. Orthodox cognitive science takes 
perception to be a process in the brain which constructs an internal representation of 
the world, whereas those working in embodied cognitive science often highlight the 
body-environment interactions that make perception possible. Noë follows this line of 
thinking, stressing the idea of “perception as a species of skilful bodily activity” (Noë 
2004, 2). He labels his approach ‘enactive’ to emphasize the role of action in 
perception. To perceive is not to passively receive sensations; rather we gain 
perceptual content by active enquiry and exploration: “Perception is not something 
that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do.” (Noë 2004, 1) 
Noë argues against our tendency to think of vision in terms of snapshot-like 
experiences of scenes, sharply focused and highly detailed. The snapshot conception 
is the starting point for most empirical work on vision, but Noë rejects it as an 
illusion. He uses results from recent work by psychologists to show that vision is 
attention dependent, and that it is much more like touch than like depiction. He 
defines vision as “a mode of exploration of the environment drawing on implicit 
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understanding of sensorimotor regularities” (Noë 2004, 29-30), where this 
understanding is practical knowledge of the way sensory stimulation changes as we 
move our bodies. 
In the orthodox cognitive science of the 1980s, vision was taken to be a 
computational process building up detailed inner representations by processing the 
external stimuli. As a computational process, it is independent of its implementation. 
However, Noë claims that to perceive like me one must have a body like mine: 
sensorimotor knowledge varies according to what sort of body one has. So vision, he 
argues, cannot be computational. Noë is careful not to argue that there are no 
representations in vision, but rather that the role of representations in perceptual 
theory needs to be reconsidered, and that detailed internal models of the world “can 
be demoted from their theoretical pride of place” (Noë 2004, 23). 
Just as Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue for cognitive processes extending 
beyond the head and involving brain, body and world, Noë argues that the basis of 
conscious experience may do similarly. He points out that if the quality of conscious 
experience is not determined solely by the neural functioning of the brain, but rather 
the way the brain is embedded in and interacting with the body and environment, then 
the scientific search for the ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ won’t reveal the 
whole story: 
“the neural substrate of a given particular perceptual experience will never be 
nomically sufficient for the occurrence of that experience, for it gives rise to 
the experience only given the background of the subject’s consciousness. […] 
There is no good reason for assuming the only relevant background is the 
activity of the brain.” (Noë 2004, 222)  
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Mind in Life, Evan Thompson 
Enaction, the term Noë uses to describe his approach to perception, was first 
articulated in the influential work The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
1991). Mind in Life (Thompson 2007), Evan Thompson’s follow-up to the book he 
co-authored with Varela and Rosch sixteen years previously, offers the clearest 
statement yet of the enactivist position. The central commitment of enactivism, 
Thompson states, is that “the human mind emerges from self-organizing processes 
that tightly interconnect the brain, body and environment” (Thompson 2007, 37). The 
concept of ‘self-organization’ is vitally important to Thompson’s account of the 
relationship between life and the mind.  
Like many others in the embodied approach to cognitive science, Thompson 
adopts the framework of dynamical systems theory. For Thompson, however, 
dynamical systems are more than just a way of describing cognitive processes without 
resorting to classical computation. He emphasizes the self-organizing features of 
dynamical living systems: biological organisms exhibit ‘organized’ behavior without 
an internal controller or programmed instructions, because order emerges from low-
level local interactions. Thompson’s main claim in this book is that these self-
organizing features of life are a basic form of the same self-organizing features that 
create minds. 
Self-organizing biological systems, Thompson claims, can also be seen as 
autonomous: they set their own tasks, rather than receiving inputs as computers do. 
Basic biological autonomy is a system’s capacity to regulate and modify its 
interactions with the environment, so an autonomous system must be one which is 
always tightly coupled to its environment. Thompson wants to claim that this 
organism–environment coupling is such that that all representations, however we 
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think of them, will belong to the coupled system of organism and environment rather 
than the organism alone. As such, representation is always context dependent: it is an 
enactment of an environment rather than an internal representation of an external 
world: 
“from the autonomy perspective a natural cognitive agent – an organism, 
animal or person – does not process information in a context-independent 
sense. Rather it brings forth or enacts meaning in structural coupling with its 
environment.” (Thompson 2007, 58) 
Thompson’s exploration of how biochemical self-organization gives rise to sentience 
and conscious experience emphasizes the extent to which cognition and consciousness 
can be thought of as emergent biological phenomena. This deep continuity of mind 
and life – the overarching message of Thompson’s book – runs counter to orthodox 
cognitive science’s reliance on artificial intelligence and computational modeling. 
Many researchers in embodied cognitive science have adopted dynamical 
systems approaches for online action-based intelligent behavior while accepting that 
some high-level abstract reasoning may be computational, but Thompson appears to 
be committed to dynamical systems for all cognitive processes. He rejects the concept 
of inner symbolic representations, but is prepared to hold onto a looser concept of 
representation, where these are thought of as “temporally extended patterns of activity 
that can crisscross the brain-body-world boundaries” (Thomson 2007, 59). Like his 
contemporaries in embodied cognitive science, Thompson is skeptical of a 
neurocentric approach to cognition:  
“the brain is not all we have, and […] it is far from obvious that any bodily 
process or environmental resource used in representing the world needs to be 
represented inside the brain.” (Thompson 2007, 241-242) 
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These breadth of positions taken in these recent works by Wilson (2004), Wheeler 
(2005), Gallagher (2005), Noë (2004) and Thompson (2007) highlight the number of 
different standpoints which are held by those who work within the general framework 
of embodied cognitive science. What primarily unites researchers working in 
embodied, embedded, enactive and extended cognition is their opposition to orthodox 
cognitive science. There are many different aspects of orthodox cognitive science 
which can be challenged – the commitment to computationalism, the emphasis on 
inner representations, the neglect of conscious experience, the focus on abstract 
disembodied reasoning rather than on real-time interactions with the world, for 
example – and one’s particular brand of embodied cognitive science will vary 
according to which aspects of orthodox cognitive science one is most interested in 
challenging. This means that when considering the implications of embodied 
cognitive science for psychopathology, it is important to remember that different 
varieties of embodied cognitive science may have different entailments, depending on 
their emphases and commitments.3  
 
 
Cognitive Science and Psychopathology 
 
By the time cognitive science became a recognized discipline, many neurological 
symptoms involving linguistic and sensory dysfunctions had been correlated with 
lesions in specific parts of the brain. Meanwhile, psychiatric disorders continue to 
elude such localization: they don’t appear to be related to obvious abnormalities of 
brain structure. Orthodox cognitive science, however, focuses not on brain structure 
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but on cognitive function, and the computational model it posits allows us to view the 
symptoms of mental disorders as resulting from ‘functional lesions’: 
“The rise of information processing models within cognitive psychology in the 
1960s and 1970s provided a springboard for explanations of abnormal 
function… An information-processing model can…be easily ‘lesioned’ 
conceptually.” (Shallice 1998, 15) 
The distinction between software and hardware in orthodox cognitive science permits 
mental disorders to be thought of as the result of ‘bugs’ in the software. Concepts and 
theories of psychiatric disorders thus appear to have a strong grounding in a 
mechanical, material view of the mind, giving them scientific credibility despite not 
being correlated with any obvious damage to the hardware of the brain.  
 As a result of orthodox cognitive science, psychiatrists no longer have to 
restrict their studies to neuropathology in order to be taken seriously as medical 
scientists. Nancy Andreasen pioneered this approach, arguing that “a relatively 
sophisticated picture is emerging that conceptualizes mental illnesses as disorders of 
mind arising in the brain” (Andreasen 1997, 1586).  Examples of the impact of 
orthodox cognitive science abound in the current literature: 
“Psychological disturbances experienced by psychiatric patients are slowly 
coming to be understood in terms of disturbances — excesses as well as 
deficits — to recognized information-processing systems.” (Halligan and 
David 2001, 209) 
The advancement of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques has 
undoubtedly assisted this trend, and also given rise to the field of cognitive 
neuropsychiatry. 
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A further explanation for the success of the orthodox model in psychiatry 
could be its ability to reconcile two competing models of psychopathology: the 
biomedical model and the biopsychosocial model. The biomedical model thinks of 
mental disorders as purely medical problems arising from the molecular biology of 
the brain, and in so doing is often accused of being reductionist and sterile. The 
biopsychosocial model (Engel 1977) sees mental disorders as interrelations between 
the patient’s brain and their psychological and social environment, but offers no 
account of any mechanisms underlying the interactions. Orthodox cognitive science 
seems to offer the best of both worlds: the computational processes provide a 
mechanistic account of cognition, while the inner representations allow for the 
involvement of psychosocial matters. Dominic Murphy (Murphy 2005) has recently 
defended this view of psychiatry as clinical cognitive neuroscience: 
“The contemporary understanding of the brain is of a social and cognitive 
organ…that looks tailor-made for synthesizing the virtues of both the medical 
model and the biopsychosocial approach” (Murphy 2005, 114) 
  It seems, then, that orthodox cognitive science provides a credible framework 
for understanding psychiatric disorder. The explanatory work, however, is being done 
by the concepts of computation and representation: precisely those aspects of the 
orthodox model about which the embodied cognitive science has serious reservations. 
  
Thus far, embodied cognitive science has had relatively little to say on matter relating 
to psychopathology. To a certain extent, this can be attributed to the embodied trend’s 
emphasis on the primacy of online cognition: given that the brain evolved to control 
action and negotiate the environment, researchers in embodied cognitive science think 
that the best way to understand cognition is to explore the relationship between 
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perception and action. Most mental disorders, however, seem to be prime examples of 
disorders of offline cognition. Consider thought disorder or delusional belief 
formation: the problems here are most naturally thought of as dysfunctions of the sort 
of inner inferential mechanisms which embodied cognitive science plays down. 
Furthermore, recall that even researchers such as Wheeler (2005) who reject the idea 
of conceiving online cognition in terms of computation and inner representations are 
open to possibility that offline cognition might be best understood by these traditional 
models. This raises the possibility that embodied cognitive science might have few or 
even no implications for the study of psychopathology. 
 This characterization of mental disorders as dysfunctions of inner inferential 
mechanisms, however, does not stand up to close scrutiny. The symptoms of 
depression, for example, involve dysfunctions of abstract thought and memory 
processes accompanied by lower level bodily symptoms such as psychomotor 
retardation and sleep and appetite problems. Disorders of affect seem to be obvious 
candidates for a more embodied approach to the mind, particularly considering recent 
work on the relation between body and emotion (Damasio 1999). Eating disorders and 
body dysmorphic disorders are other areas of psychopathology in which it seems 
natural to think that an embodied approach will be more explanatory than the 
orthodox cognitive science alternative. These considerations reflect the similar 
concern in phenomenological psychiatry that some disorders may result from 
disturbances in embodied interaction with the environment: if this is the case, it is not 
clear that treating mental disorder as a problem of high-level cognitive mechanisms 
will solve the problem (Stanghellini 2004). 
 Certain mental disorders pose more of a challenge to embodied cognitive 
science. Delusional beliefs seem to be cases where the external world is being 
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misrepresented internally, and therefore posit the sort of traditional representations 
many embodied theorists would have us do without. One way to deal with such cases 
is to redescribe them: recall Gallagher’s (2004) attempt to explain our ‘theory of 
mind’ capacities without internal inferential mechanisms. Gallagher uses his account 
of embodied interactions to argue that autism, often seen as involving a deficit in an 
internal ‘theory of mind mechanism’, is actually the result of disruption to more basic 
sensorimotor processes. Even where orthodox cognitive science has seemingly 
produced good explanatory models of psychopathology (such as Frith’s (1992) 
account of cognitive processes in schizophrenia, which Gallagher (2004) explores), 
the embodied theorist can point to a neglect of the phenomenology of the disorder in 
question, or its biological basis, or to the temporal aspects which a computational 
account can’t capture. If sensory and motor processes are basic to all other cognition, 
as much research in embodied cognitive science posits, then disorders which have 
traditionally been viewed as dysfunctions of higher cognitive processes could in fact 
be explained by lower-level sensorimotor processes. 
 If psychiatry were to adopt the central points of embodied cognitive science, 
what would be the practical repercussions of so doing? A new model of 
psychopathology would be required, one which conceived of mental disorders as 
disorders of embodied brains embedded in their natural and social environments. 
Under the dynamical systems framework favored by embodied cognitive, it is not 
clear that mental disorders could still be thought of as caused by functional ‘lesions’: 
talk of such lesions seems to rely on the sorts of mechanistic explanations which 
dynamical systems arguably don’t provide (Bechtel 1998). Furthermore, brain 
imaging studies would lose their status as ‘pictures of the mind’: if the neural aspect is 
only part of the cognitive system comprising brain, body and world, then 
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neuroimaging is only telling part of the a much larger and more complicated story. 
The brain functions in question may be necessary for the mental activity, but not 
sufficient. 
 There may also be ethical implications of some of the ideas in embodied 
cognitive science. The very fact that there is now a discipline of ‘neuroethics’ 
suggests that interfering with people’s brains, pharmacologically or surgically, for 
example, is perceived to raise issues that aren’t posed by therapeutic intervention in 
people’s environments or patterns of behavior. But if the brain is only a part of the 
wider cognitive system, as some work in embodied cognitive science suggests, it is 
not clear that this grounding assumptions of neuroethics can be retained. At the least, 
it 
“alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought 
to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which 
interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions.” (Levy 2007, 3) 
 
For many people working in psychopathology, the main problem with orthodox 
cognitive science was its disinterest in conscious experience. Phenomenological 
psychiatry, with its emphasis on lived experience and personal meaning, has 
traditionally seemed at odds with the scientific model of biological psychiatry; but 
embodied cognitive science may offer a way to ‘naturalize’ phenomenology, making 
it a respectable subject for scientific study (Morley 2002). The embodied approach to 
cognitive science could provide researchers with a framework which emphasizes both 
the experiential qualities and the bodily aspects of mental life and its disorders. It is 
important to remember, however, that there is much work in embodied cognitive 
science which is not concerned with the structure or quality of conscious experience, 
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and that many of the implications of embodied cognitive science for psychopathology 
may have little to say on phenomenology. Given the different stances on 
representation and computation highlighted in the recent work, it seems that a major 
challenge for embodied cognitive science will be to come up with an explanatory 
model of the origin and development of psychiatric disorders which can adequately 
compete with the current orthodox model.4      
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1
 This view of cognition has been challenged most notably by John Searle (1984), 
who argues that we are not entitled to see the symbolic structures in computations as 
representational: “syntax alone is not sufficient for semantics, and digital computers 
insofar as they are computers have, by definition, a syntax alone” (Searle 1984, 34). 
2
 Ramsey (2007) argues that what are termed ‘representations’ in connectionist 
networks are not representational in the same sense as the symbols of classical 
computationalism and do not play the same explanatory role.  
3
 The different varieties of embodied cognitive science outlined here may be in 
tension with each other: some seem to suggest that the details of our embodiment play 
a special and non-eliminable contribution to our mental states, whereas for others the 
body plays a vital part in cognition in virtue of its particular functional role. See Clark 
(2008) for further discussion. 
4
 With thanks to Andy Clark, Richard Gipps, Finn Spicer, Dan Weiskopf and two 
anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions.  
